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ABSTRACT
This case study evolves around four announcements related to a specific
corporate restructuring proposal. The primary reason for the corporate
restructuring is to restructure the debt of six companies: Lion Industries
(LICB), Silverstone (SCB), Amsteel Corp Berhad (ACB), Lion Corporation
(LCB), Lion Forest Industries (LFI), and Lion Diversified Holding Berhad
(LDH). The track record of the companies revealed that these companies have
been heavily levered causing them to be financially risky and therefore, highly
sensitive to any economic shocks, let alone a fatal financial typhoon like the
1997 economic crisis. As at the end of the study period on June 30, 2003, that
is, more than three years after the initial announcement of the proposed
corporate restructuring, the plan has yet to be completed. Nonetheless, the
present study had managed to produce some interesting results. By applying
the common event-study approach, the results indicated that information about
the restructuring plan has been significantly conveyed to the market in each
restructuring announcement. Generally, the market regards all
announcements in event window (-1,+1) unfavourably.
Keywords: Financial Ratio; Corporate Restructuring; Event Study.
Topic Code: Case Studies/Finance.
ABSTRAK
Kajian kes ini memberi fokus kepada empat pengumuman cadangan
penstrukturan korporat Syarikat Kumpulan Lion Berhad yang terdiri
daripada, Lion Industries (LICB), Silverstone (SCB), Amsteel Corp Berhad
(ACB), Lion Corporation (LCB), Lion Forest Industries (LFI) and Lionw
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Diversified Holding Berhad (LDH). Didapati kumpulan syarikat ini
menggunakan pembiayaan hutang yang tinggi menyebabkan syarikat terdedah
kepada risiko kewangan yang tinggi dan sangat sensitif  kepada perubahan
ekonomi, terutama pada masa kegawatan ekonomi 1997. Setelah tamat tempoh
kajian (Jan 1990 – Jun 2003), penstrukturan korporat syarikat masih belum
berakhir lagi. Walau bagaimananpun beberapa penemuan menarik dikesan,
antaranya ialah maklumat berkenaan cadangan penstrukturan korporat
syarikat telah berjaya disampaikan secara signifikan kepada pasaran pada setiap
kali pengumuman dibuat dan secara keseluruhannya pasaran menganggap
kesemua pengumuman pada tetingkap peristiwa (-1,+1) sebagai tidak menarik.
Kata kunci: Nisbah kewangan; penstrukturan korporat; kajian peristiwa.
kod topik: kajian peristiwa/kewangan.
INTRODUCTION
The origin and more specifically the growth and performance of the
business firm have always been an object of considerable interest to
scholars especially from business related disciplines such as finance
and strategic management. The fact that managers may be facing with
a changing environment makes firms vulnerable to unforeseen
circumstances that lead to poor performance. A long period of poor
performance may gradually bring firms into financial distress. Financial
distress is defined as the condition in which the liquidation value of
the firm’s assets is less than the total value of creditor claims (Weston,
Mitchell, & Mulherin, 2001). Firms must seek a way out to resolve and
remove the operational and financial constraints due to the financial
distress. Corporate restructuring, be it voluntary or involuntary, is a
way out for these troubled firms in order to survive. The corporate
restructuring schemes may vary from one to another, but the objectives
should basically enable the troubled firms to reduce or remove the
current operational and financial constraints, and enhance the firm
value. Voluntary restructuring is accomplished without a threat by
external mechanisms while involuntary restructuring is a response to
adversarial external mechanisms. Ofek (1993) outlined two major
responses known as operational and financial. Operational responses
include (1) changing the asset structure by selling assets, divesting
divisions, and discontinuing unprofitable operations; (2) changing the
size and scope of operation by consolidating production facilities and
laying off of employees; and (3) changing top management. Financial
responses include dividend cuts, debt restructuring, and bankruptcy
filings. Debt restructuring is defined as an agreement by the firm’s
creditors to resolve outstanding financial claims currently held againstw
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the firm. Voluntary debt restructuring are informal and simple. They
are also relatively inexpensive because legal and administrative
expenses are held to a minimum. If the situation is such that informal
procedures are not feasible, then it becomes necessary to use formal
reorganisation or formal bankruptcy proceedings.
In terms of the Malaysian setting, none has studied the determinants,
firms’ characteristics, and overall performance of the corporate
restructuring exercise either using overall data on restructured firms
or a case approach based on individual firms. Hence, this case study
approach is expected to contribute to the body of knowledge in the
area of corporate restructuring and policy making guidelines in relation
to the corporate restructuring exercise.
This case study on corporate restructuring had involved six public
listed companies of the Lion Group, with four classified under the
Practice Note 4 (PN4) imposed by Malaysian Securities Exchanges
Berhad, which was effective in February 13, 2001, namely Lion
Corporation Berhad (LCB - PN4 since 26/2/01), Amsteel Corporation
Berhad (ACB - PN4 since 25/5/01), Lion Industries Corporation Berhad
(LICB) and Silverstone Corporation Berhad (SCB), PN4 since 23/5/
02. The other two are Lion Forest Industries (LFI) and Lion Diversified
Holding Berhad (LDH), formerly known as Chocolate Product Bhd.
Under the PN4, an affected listed issuer that fails to comply with the
obligations set out may be suspended and/or de-listed. The provisions
of this PN4 include one or more of the following:
a. Deficit in the adjusted shareholders’ equity of the listed issuer
on a consolidated basis;
b. Receivers and/or managers have been appointed over the
property of the listed issuer, or over the property of its major
subsidiary or major associated company which property
accounts for at least 70% of the total assets employed of the listed
issuer on a consolidated basis;
c. The auditors have expressed adverse or disclaimer opinion in
respect of the listed issuer’s going concern, in its latest audited
accounts; or
d. Special administrators have been appointed over the listed issuer
or the major subsidiary or major associated company of the listed
issuer pursuant to the provisions of the Pengurusan Danaharta
Nasional Berhad Act 1998.
LICB suffered its first deficit in shareholders’ equity for the year ended
30 June 1999 (-1.3 billion) followed by ACB in 2001 (-0.47 billion), LCB
and SCB the year after (Table 1). Thereafter, the entire group began to
streamline its financial condition via its proposed corporate and debtw
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restructuring exercises, which was announced as Group Wide
Restructuring Scheme (GWRS) or also known as Proposed Corporate
Restructuring (PCR). The first announcement was made via the KLSE
link on 5 July 2000 and was followed then by three major revisions on
8 October 2001, 26 March 2002 and 21 February 2003. As at 5 March
2003, the entire group was suspended from trading on the KLSE before
resuming trading on 1 April 2003.
Lion Corporation Berhad (LCB) is the group’s investment holding
company while Lion Industries Corporation Berhad (LICB) (formerly
known as Lion Land Berhad) engaged in manufacturing of steel bars,
beer brewing, and pulp and paper mill operation. Silverstone
Corporation Berhad (SCB) (formerly known as Angkasa Marketing
Berhad) engaged in property development and retailing, while Amsteel
Corporation Berhad (ACB) engaged in the business of manufacturing
tyres and distribution of motorcycles. Lion Diversified Holding
engaged in breweries and property investment holding, while Lion
Forest Industries is involved in the timber industry. As at 1 April 2005,
the corporate restructuring exercise has still remaining outstanding
items not resolved.
The purpose of this study is to achieve the following research objectives:
1. To track the financial history that leads to financial distress.
2. To identify operational and financial responses that have been
taken and proposed in the restructuring scheme.
3. To determine whether or not the announcements convey
information to the market.
4. To estimate the wealth effects of the specific restructuring
announcements and the combined wealth effects of these
announcements.
THE FINANCIAL BACKGROUND
The Financial History
The selected financial data in this study were selected based on its
theoretical relationships with the probability of firm to meet its debt-
service obligations. Ofek (1993) and Baek, Kang, and Park (2001) used
two basic variables (capital structure and profitability) when examining
the responses of financially distressed firms to poor performance. Most
of the capital structure characteristics used by Ofek (1993) that were
adopted included leverage, liquidity ratios, and market value of equity
(MVE). Leverage is measured by debt ratio, total debt to equity ratio,w
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and interest coverage ratio. Liquidity is measured by current ratio and
acid test ratio, while MVE is measured by market price multiplied by
number of shares outstanding. Following Ofek (1993), profitability
measure is earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation (EBITD),
because the main purpose was to evaluate the firm’s operating ability
to pay interest in addition to return on equity and return on total assets.
The net tangible asset (NTA) per share was also reported as an indicator
of the firm’s fundamental value. Dividend per share was reported to
see responses of the company regarding its dividend policy when faced
with poor performance (Ofek, 1993; Severin, 2000). Total assets and
total debts were used to see, among others, the size and turning points
when these firms finally become heavily burdened with debts.
Over the period of study, the Group has remarkably expanded into
various activities and used considerably large debt to finance these
expansion activities. The large debt effect had worsened when the
financial crisis hit the region in mid-1997. Consequently, the entire
Group suffered from extremely high leverage and large losses. LICB
recorded negative shareholders equity during year 1990 (RM-61.66
Million), 1991 (RM-76.746 Million), and 1999 (RM-1,305 Million). ACB
recorded negative shareholders equity during year 2001 (RM-469.516
Million), 2002 (RM-1,179.782 Million) and 2004 (RM-1,165.14 Million),
while the other companies also suffered significant erosion of their
shareholders funds, except for LFI and LDH.
Lion group assets increased steadily during the period 1990 to 1999,
but after that, some of the companies had their assets reduced as part
of the group divestment. The group paid-up capital also increased
steadily during the study period.
The EBITD stream of ACB, LCB, LICB, and SCB was fluctuating, but
decreasing over the years and this was inadequate to cover the huge
amount of debts and depreciation from large fixed assets investments,
thus, and they suffered huge losses substantially from 1998 to 2002.
Each company registered a huge amount of debts over the study period,
for example LCB from RM121.674 million (1990) to RM5.004 billion
(2004). This had indicated that the companies used more debt to finance
their asset expansion as compared to equity. Consequently, the Group
had suffered huge fixed commitment in terms of loan principal and
interest payment denominated in US and local currencies. Table 1
displays a serious erosion of NTA (except for LICB and LFI) indicating
that most of the assets for the whole Group are not owned by their
shareholders but rather creditors. From Table 1, it can be seen that all
Lion group companies, except for LICB, LFI, and LDH, have total debtsw
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to total assets of more than 75% towards 2004, and this served to
indicate that creditors nearly own the group. This evidence is further
supported by the debt to equity ratios, which had clearly exceeded
100% of equity available to these companies.
Table 1
Leverage Ratio of the companies for the period of 1990 – 2004
Amsteel Lion Corp
Year TD/TA
(%)
TD/TE BL/TA
(%)
BL/TD
(%)
IC TD/TA
(%)
TD/TE BL/TA
(%)
BL/TD
(%)
IC
1990 58.05 1.38 20.32 35.01 4.06 33.55 0.50 na na na
1991 65.27 1.88 22.17 33.96 2.69 43.06 0.76 28.93 67.19 4.18
1992 67.13 2.04 30.77 45.84 1.69 52.02 1.08 37.23 71.56 2.68
1993 63.92 1.77 22.36 34.97 1.19 56.74 1.31 40.45 71.29 1.50
1994 69.53 2.28 51.53 74.11 1.82 na na na na na
1995 69.75 2.31 50.56 72.48 1.50 52.13 1.09 37.48 71.89 2.39
1996 71.32 2.49 53.92 75.60 0.92 58.78 1.43 42.72 72.67 1.62
1997 73.57 2.78 55.29 75.15 0.93 53.75 1.16 40.40 75.17 1.84
1998 71.33 2.49 57.09 80.03 -1.58 81.03 4.27 71.09 87.73 -7.29
1999 76.61 3.27 57.41 74.95 -1.36 84.89 5.62 70.79 83.39 -0.01
2000 81.15 4.31 58.61 72.22 -1.07 88.39 7.61 66.76 75.53 -5.12
2001 103.70 -27.99 59.45 57.32 -1.26 95.85 23.10 67.88 70.82 -1.83
2002 109.82 -11.19 60.10 54.73 -1.06 99.71 343.87 66.17 66.36 -0.83
2003 95.53 21.35 2.93 3.07 3.78 85.81 6.05 36.28 42.28 1.16
2004 129.14 -4.43 2.08 1.61 0.18 85.71 6.00 33.25 38.79 0.89
Lion Ind Silverstone
Year TD/TA
(%)
TD/TE BL/TA
(%)
BL/TD
(%)
IC TD/TA
(%)
TD/TE BL/TA
(%)
BL/TD
(%)
IC
1990 138.27 -3.61 61.59 44.54 -0.80 64.15 1.79 0.00 0.00 192.60
1991 156.26 -2.78 61.70 39.49 -0.83 56.65 1.31 0.59 1.05 10.89
1992 27.74 0.38 6.05 21.81 27.80 61.89 1.62 3.19 5.15 7.54
1993 69.57 2.29 15.03 21.61 3.29 61.24 1.58 4.86 7.93 2.12
1994 75.55 3.09 17.52 23.20 2.15 61.99 1.63 31.38 50.63 2.41
1995 56.67 1.31 36.74 64.83 2.75 62.64 1.68 38.38 61.28 1.70
1996 59.58 1.47 41.40 69.48 1.21 69.91 2.32 31.51 45.07 1.73
1997 54.82 1.21 39.46 71.97 1.82 75.70 3.12 39.59 52.30 2.15
1998 62.77 1.69 48.67 77.54 -0.19 76.27 3.21 49.23 64.54 -1.02
1999 202.69 -1.97 161.11 79.49 -0.37 76.76 3.30 46.48 60.54 -0.32
2000 70.09 2.34 46.48 66.31 -0.58 81.67 4.45 49.48 60.59 -1.53
2001 79.61 3.91 49.01 61.56 -2.83 90.44 9.46 51.12 56.53 -2.34
2002 85.16 5.74 48.08 56.46 -1.24 104.09 -25.47 55.74 53.55 -3.14
2003 71.49 2.51 30.86 43.17 0.91 82.82 4.82 28.45 34.35 1.42
2004 57.02 1.33 29.49 51.71 3.73 75.00 3.00 13.30 17.73 -0.64
Lion Forest Industries Lion Diversified Holding
Year TD/TA
(%)
TD/TE BL/TA
(%)
BL/TD
(%)
IC TD/TA
(%)
TD/TE BL/TA
(%)
BL/TD
(%)
IC
1990 87.62 7.08 44.32 50.58 1.84 95.08 19.34 47.67 50.14 0.82
1991 84.66 5.52 43.98 51.95 2.21 86.91 6.64 44.46 51.16 2.00
1992 68.40 2.16 19.93 29.15 3.05 85.82 6.05 41.92 48.85 1.79
1993 67.35 2.06 13.96 20.73 3.79 90.27 9.28 61.92 68.59 -0.32
1994 69.11 2.24 6.20 8.97 2.42 63.49 1.74 45.35 71.43 0.48
1995 70.80 2.42 39.08 55.20 1.61 66.30 1.97 40.93 61.74 -0.79
1996 72.09 2.58 38.38 53.23 1.13 44.74 0.81 29.55 66.04 1.82w
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Notes: BL/TA is the ratio of bank loans to total assets and TD/TA is the ratio
of total debts to total assets.  TD/TE is the ratio of total debts to total
equity and BL/TE is the ratio of bank loans to total equity. BL/TD is
the ratio of bank loans to total debts and IC is the interest coverage for
the companies.
The Group’s bank loan to total debt were in the range of 45% - 75% in
the last three years prior to the crisis, except for LFI. Overall, it may be
concluded that these companies’ debt management was not really
prudent, which consequently dragged the companies into severe
financial condition and distress. The Group announced it had been
unable to meet its interest and fee obligations and subsequently
announced a debt restructuring arrangement in 5 July, 2000. These
scenarios were consistent with Gilson, Kose & Lang (1990) where higher
leveraged firms are most likely to experience corporate restructuring
once default occurs. The companies’ current ratios were mostly below
1.0, as shown in Table 3, with the lowest ratio recorded in 2002 (0.084)
by LCB and the highest in 2003 (4.6) by SFI. This means that their current
liabilities were rising faster than its current assets, which subsequently
deteriorated both companies’ liquidity positions. Acid test ratios were
also low with the lowest recorded in 1990 (0.072) by LCB and the highest
in 2000 (3.465) by SFI.’
Table 4 shows the profitability ratios for the companies. The Group
profitability was badly hit during the financial crisis. All companies
recorded negative ROE during the 1998 financial year, and this situation
continued for several years after that period, before slowly recovering
from the restructuring exercise carried out. The ROTA stream was
fluctuating, but decreasing over the years which indicated the
inefficient use of assets, and this was proven by lowered Tobin’s Q
value that was lower than 1.0 by most of the companies.
The scenario depicted by Table 1 through to 4, consistently indicated a
deteriorating liquidity, weak profitability, and increasing debt burden.
(continued Table 1)
1997 11.81 0.13 4.06 34.41 3.58 54.28 1.19 34.34 63.27 0.52
1998 13.83 0.16 3.87 27.97 2.57 50.88 1.04 30.07 59.10 -0.67
1999 11.43 0.13 5.50 48.13 3.84 48.71 0.95 26.42 54.25 -0.20
2000 8.12 0.09 3.06 37.67 13.90 49.82 0.99 24.51 49.20 -1.00
2001 7.93 0.09 2.89 36.42 7.17 50.90 1.04 25.26 49.63 0.53
2002 5.77 0.06 1.91 33.11 0.46 53.80 1.16 24.62 45.77 0.20
2003 4.87 0.05 1.25 25.77 4.93 53.62 1.16 23.58 43.97 1.04
2004 5.79 0.06 0.87 15.09 26.25 59.76 1.49 12.98 21.71 35.63
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Table 3
Profitability Ratios of the companies for the period 1990 – 2004
Table 2
Liquidity Ratios of the companies for the period 1990 – 2004

 
 ACB LCB LICB 
Year 
ROE 
(%) 
ROTA 
(%) 
Tobin's 
Q 
ROE 
(%) 
ROTA 
(%) 
Tobin's 
Q 
ROE 
(%) 
ROTA 
(%) 
Tobin's 
Q 
1990 9.46 3.97 1.38 5.76 3.83 1.06 18.80 -7.19 1.28 
1991 12.82 4.45 1.09 7.97 4.54 0.79 7.29 -4.10 1.22 
1992 9.71 3.19 0.60 5.86 2.81 0.40 14.93 10.79 1.40 
1993 7.88 2.84 1.13 8.24 3.56 0.89 10.32 3.14 1.31 
1994 9.42 2.87 0.72 na na na 13.67 3.34 1.72 
1995 6.12 1.85 0.47 16.19 7.75 0.65 7.79 3.37 0.67 
1996 4.69 1.34 0.30 7.83 3.23 0.60 8.81 3.56 0.62 
1997 4.25 1.12 0.18 6.05 2.80 0.24 13.96 6.30 0.31 
1998 -23.00 -6.59 0.19 -71.38 -13.54 0.80 -1.83 -0.68 0.22 
1999 -24.84 -5.81 -0.19 -61.84 -9.35 0.62 4.12 -4.23 0.16 
2000 -25.15 -4.74 -0.37 -62.49 -7.25 0.40 -7.72 -2.31 -0.08 
2001 143.80 -5.33 -0.31 -165.16 -6.85 0.07 -55.95 -11.41 -0.20 
2002 48.81 -4.79 -0.39 -956.88 -2.77 1.14 -31.03 -4.60 -0.23 
2003 319.99 14.32 0.63 7.24 1.03 0.55 3.80 1.08 0.49 
2004 -2.14 0.62 1.05 5.18 0.74 0.42 13.84 5.95 0.62 
 
 SCB LFI LDH 
Year 
ROE 
(%) 
ROTA 
(%) 
Tobin's 
Q 
ROE 
(%) 
ROTA 
(%) 
Tobin's 
Q 
ROE 
(%) 
ROTA 
(%) 
Tobin's 
Q 
1990 12.53 4.49 0.35 25.85 3.20 na 34.14 1.68 1.34 
1991 2.91 1.26 1.90 28.26 4.33 na 60.68 7.94 1.95 
1992 22.18 8.45 0.95 14.80 4.68 na 49.34 7.00 1.50 
1993 10.51 4.07 1.39 16.91 5.52 1.97 -21.61 -2.10 3.66 
1994 11.52 4.38 0.94 7.22 2.23 1.00 3.18 1.16 1.85 
1995 10.58 3.95 0.48 11.33 3.31 1.03 -5.69 -1.92 3.04 
1996 10.78 3.24 0.41 8.76 2.45 4.16 3.26 1.80 0.66 
1997 13.29 3.23 0.18 0.74 0.65 0.33 0.67 0.31 0.21 
1998 -17.60 -4.18 0.11 1.57 1.36 0.24 -4.31 -2.12 0.17 
1999 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 2.15 1.90 0.28 -1.75 -0.90 0.09 
2000 -25.74 -4.72 -0.20 3.83 3.52 0.33 -7.22 -3.62 0.10 
ACB LCB LICB SCB LFI LDH
Year CR QR CR QR CR QR CR QR CR QR CR QR
1990 1.01 0.39 1.51 1.04 0.25 0.10 1.54 1.54 0.92 0.73 0.58 0.28
1991 1.08 0.44 1.06 0.72 0.30 0.16 1.64 1.14 0.69 0.46 0.87 0.42
1992 0.84 0.41 0.79 0.55 2.11 1.08 1.32 0.78 0.99 0.64 0.79 0.37
1993 0.95 0.48 0.82 0.61 0.90 0.63 1.32 0.74 1.26 0.95 0.68 0.32
1994 0.91 0.58 na na 0.89 0.68 1.16 0.75 1.33 0.97 0.93 0.59
1995 0.87 0.55 0.82 0.57 1.13 0.73 0.97 0.73 1.16 0.93 0.72 0.43
1996 0.74 0.47 0.74 0.46 1.08 0.78 0.95 0.75 1.09 0.88 1.16 0.84
1997 0.80 0.59 0.83 0.48 1.23 0.97 0.90 0.73 1.26 0.57 0.89 0.69
1998 0.69 0.48 0.96 0.62 1.02 0.83 0.79 0.59 1.22 0.73 0.76 0.57
1999 0.44 0.31 0.75 0.52 0.88 0.79 0.79 0.68 1.37 0.86 0.71 0.50
2000 0.39 0.26 0.57 0.34 0.79 0.71 0.67 0.56 2.08 1.37 0.73 0.55
2001 0.34 0.25 0.36 0.17 0.66 0.57 0.54 0.45 2.52 1.63 0.79 0.60
2002 0.35 0.26 0.084 0.07 0.65 0.56 0.51 0.43 3.60 2.66 0.73 0.53
2003 0.90 0.78 0.59 0.32 1.08 0.72 0.60 0.45 4.62 3.46 0.75 0.57
2004 1.01 0.93 0.45 0.18 1.68 0.94 0.79 0.58 3.88 2.85 0.94 0.72
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Of the six companies, it was observed that from Table 2, LCB, LICB,
and ACB rely more on term loans compared to the other companies.
This scenario is symptomatic of a financial distress for a company that
has consistently showed deteriorating liquidity and weak profitability,
and yet increasingly trusting debt capital.
Provided debt is the underlying reason for financial distress and it is
interesting to discover that banks and financial intermediaries, which
are considered special in an economy for their capability to closely
monitor their portfolio investment, are among the creditors to these
firms. Ofek (1993) argued that private debt held by intermediaries offers
a monitoring role, especially as it gets into trouble, while small investors
who usually hold public debt do not monitor. The monitoring which
minimises about the firms causes large bank borrowing to serve as a
signal that the firms are undertaking positive NPV projects (Leland &
Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984; Allen & Santomero, 1998; Agarwal & Elston,
2001). In addition, as free-rider investors read the favorable signal, the
firm would benefit because it would have greater accesses to external
funds. All these and the tendency to obtain stronger support from banks
during economic difficulties lead toward increasing the value of the
company. That is, the bank monitoring minimises information
asymmetry and thus agency costs would be reduced.
Furthermore, Gilson et al. (1990) reported that firms with a high ratio
bank debt are more likely to successfully restructure their debt.
Nonetheless, Baek et al. (2001) explained that the bank-firm relationship
may be negative in a case where bank credits are used because
availability of alternative external funds is limited or non-existent. All
2001 -98.80 -9.44 -0.38 1.82 1.67 0.30 -0.42 -0.20 0.20 
2002 285.64 -11.67 -0.49 -0.02 -0.02 0.33 -1.07 -0.50 0.15 
2003 31.33 5.38 0.09 0.41 0.39 0.36 -0.08 -0.04 0.10 
2004 -14.22 -3.55 0.43 1.96 1.84 0.42 37.50 15.09 0.32 
 
(continued Table 3)
ACB = Amsteel Corporation Berhad LCB = Lion Corporation
Berhad
LICB  = Lion Industries Corporation SCB  = Silverstone
Berhad Corporation Berhad
LFI = Lion Forest Industries LDH = Lion Diversified
Holding/Chocolate
Product
w
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of the above arguments emphasise on the monitoring role of the
financial institutions, especially banks, to reduce asymmetric
information and agency cost that consequently assist in improving the
firm’s value or performance. Brickley and Van Drunen (1990) and
Francis, Hanna, and Vincent (1996) found a positive stock market
reaction to the initial restructuring announcement, but Brickley and
Van Drunen (1990) also found that those firm restructuring to reduce
costs continued to lag the market and industry return on equity up to
three years after the restructuring. These studies suggested that
although the restructuring is initially welcomed by the market,
investors may experience difficulty interpreting the valuation impact
of restructuring.
The Relationship between Firm Performance, Leverage and
Investment
Theoretically, debt overhang problem or underinvestment is a situation
whereby the firm may not be able to finance positive NPV investment
due to its existing debt obligation. This situation, as portrayed in Figure
1.1 to 1.6, shows that as debt increases, the total assets remain
unchanged or fall, followed by lower profitability and an increase in
Tobin’s Q value. In the case of the Lion Group, underivestment
behaviour or debt overhang occurred during year 1990 to 1992 and
1999 in LCB. As for LICB, debt overhang occured during year 1992,
while for ACB this scenario occured in 1994 to 1996, 1998 to 2000, and
2002. A series of debt overhang occurred during year 1995 to 2003 in
SCB. A series of GWRS from 2000 to 2003 had somewhat corrected this
debt overhang problem and subsequently improved the companies’
performance. There are no clear indications for SFI and LDH.
Ownership Structure
The corporate restructuring proposal resulted in refocusing the core
business for each of the subsidiaries as follows:
i) Lion Corporation Berhad (LCB): Steel through Megasteel.
ii) Lion Industries Corp. Berhad (LICB): Steel and wood products
through Sabah Forest Industries.
iii) Chocolate Products (LDH): Breweries and property investment
holding.
iv) Silverstone: Automotive through Suzuki and Silverstone, also
tyre.
v) Amsteel Corporation Berhad (ACB): Property development,
Parkson retail and plantation assets.w
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The Role of Bank Monitoring
As reported in Table 2, average bank loans relative to total debt (BL/
TD) were between 35% (LFI) and 68% (LCB) capital during 1990 to
2004. While, total value bank loans as at 2004 is about RM10 billion
(RM 9,500,357,000). Agarwal and Elston (2001) argued that firms that
maintain a close relationship with banks tend to be better off in their
performance. That is, as bank monitoring minimises information
asymmetry, thus agency costs would be reduced. Since banks are the
main creditors of the financially distressed companies, asymmetric
information and therefore agency costs cannot explain why the bank-
firm relationship in this case does not conform to the arguments in
previous studies. With the Malaysian capital market for debt (PDS or
private debt securities) still being very much inactive, access to external
funds is restricted to equity capital. However, market timing is all
wrong in an economic environment which is still recovering from at
least next to worst economic crisis causing firms to turn away to the
only alternative source of funds, i.e banks. Baek et al. (2001) argued
that in such a condition where the bank is simply the main source of
capital, the resulting relationship may indeed significantly adversely
affect the firm’s value just as the case of Korean firms. Heavy reliance
on banks (or any particular substantial stakeholder) has a trade-off. In
return to access to a pool of funds, banks would closely and constantly
monitor firms. The very existence of banks is viewed as a pool of
household and firm surpluses for greater, or at least equal but never
less, consumption in the future. Their obligation to lenders (and also
the central bank and the government) and the availability of resources
require banks to be more likely than other groups of creditors to force
defaulting companies to file for involuntary bankruptcy.
THE PROPOSED CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING
The Board of Directors of the Lion Group had announced the proposed
Group Wide Restructuring Scheme (GWRS) or Proposed Corporate
Restructuring (PCR) to provide the Lion Group the ability to meet their
financial commitments to creditors, to continue operations on an
ongoing concern basis, and in the long-term to regain a position of
profitability. Details of the GWRS on the first announcement dated 5
July 2000 (referred to as PCR-I), second announcement (referred to as
PCR-II) dated 8 October 2001, third announcement (referred to as PCR-
III) dated 26 March, 2002, and the fourth announcement (referred to as
PCR-IV) dated 22 March 2003. Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 exhibit the
corporate and shareholding structure before and after the proposed
restructuring.w
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The Group had taken some operational and financial measures as
announced in the GWRS, which can be summarised as follows1:
PCR-I (5 July, 2000)
i) the proposed corporate restructuring exercise for LCB, LLB,
ACB, AMB, and CPB is to facilitate the tapping of future cashflow
from various key operating entities (“KOC”) in the Lion Group
in respect of which the business outlook is expected to be stable
for the purposes of the debt restructuring exercise, and where
possible, to streamline each listed group such that they have
one-two core businesses (“Proposed Corporate Restructuring
Exercise”);
ii) the proposed divestment programme for the LCB, LLB, ACB,
AMB, and CPB to rationalise their activities through the sale of
non-core and peripheral assets and businesses (“Proposed
Divestment Programme”);
iii) the pooling of cashflow from KOCs and proceeds from the
divestment programmes under the relevant listed company;
iv) the consolidation of applicable debts of affected subsidiaries
(“Scheme Companies”) of the relevant listed company at the
listed company level for settlement by the listed company; and
v) the pooling together of the applicable debts and the application
of the pool of cashflow available for repayment of the applicable
debts, at the relevant listed company level, are to reduce the
risk of default through diversification of sources of cashflow
backing repayment (“Proposed Debt Restructuring Exercises”).
PCR-II Revised GWRS Proposals (8 October, 2001)
However, subsequent to the aforesaid announcement, it became
apparent that the growth of the Malaysian economy had reduced
significantly and the economy faced the prospect of further slow down,
due to the stronger than expected deceleration of growth in the
economy of the United States of America, the continuing weakness of
the Japanese economy, and the uncertainties facing the global financial
markets.
The weaker domestic economy had led to less favourable operating
conditions which have necessitated downward revisions under the
Initial GWRS Proposals to the projected cashflows of Megasteel Sdn
Bhd (“Megasteel”), Silverstone Bhd (“Silverstone”), and Sabah Forest
Industries Sdn Bhd (“SFI”) (collectively referred to as the “Key
Operating Companies”) and lower projected realisable divestmentw
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proceeds from the sale of non-core and peripheral assets, both of which
are key sources of cashflows to support the proposed repayment of
the Lion Group’s debts under the Initial GWRS Proposals. Furthermore,
the level of indebtedness of the scheme companies whose debts are to
be restructured as set out, has increased as a result of interest accrued.
In view of the foregoing, revisions have been made to the structure
and terms of the various debt restructuring, asset divestment, and
corporate restructuring exercises proposed earlier under the Initial
GWRS Proposals.
Key Changes under the Revised GWRS Proposals
i) Reduction of the share capitals of LCB, LLB, AMB and ACB.
ii) Reduction in the yield-to-maturity (“YTM”) applicable to the
Bonds and Consolidated and Rescheduled Debts to be issued to
affected financial institution creditors (“FI-Creditors”). Waiver
of certain principal portion of the Outstanding Principal
Amounts by the affected FI-Creditors.
iii) Longer repayment profile for the Bonds and Consolidated and
Rescheduled Debts to be issued under the Revised GWRS
Proposals.
iv) Reduction in the transaction values of assets to be transferred
under the proposed corporate restructuring exercises under the
Revised GWRS Proposals.
PCR-III (26 March 2002)
Due to changes in the domestic and global market conditions, revisions
were made to the structure and terms of the Initial Revised GWRS
Proposals.
Following the close of the first half of the financial year ending 30 June
2002, the Lion Group’s management had re-examined the operational
performance and actual financial results achieved by the key operating
companies within the Lion Group such as Megasteel and noted that
the actual results achieved were lower than previously forecasted in
the Revised GWRS Proposals. As a consequence, the future financial
forecast and projections of the key operating companies have been
further revised. The revisions have had a flow-through impact on the
terms of the Revised GWRS Proposals. In view of the foregoing, further
revisions have been made to the terms of the Revised GWRS Proposals
(collectively referred to as the “Further Revisions”) in the manner set
out hereafter.w
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Key Changes Under the Further Revisions
Generally, the Further Revisions relate to and/or involve the following:
i) Reduction in the transaction values of assets to be transferred
under the proposed corporate restructuring exercises, and
variation in the structure, terms, and mode of settlement of
certain assets to be transferred under the proposed corporate
restructuring exercises.
ii) Slower build-up in the repayment profile of the Bonds and
Consolidated and Rescheduled Debts to be issued.
iii) Revisions in the proposed mode of settlement for financial
institution creditors (“FI-Creditors”) in the LCB Scheme
Companies and ACB Scheme Companies as listed in Table 1 of
the earlier announcement dated 8 October 2001, in respect of
their portion of the indebtedness which is unsecured.
PCR-IV (22 March 2003)
i) The Lion Group had obtained the approvals for the listing of
and quotation for new shares, warrants (ACB), and new shares
to be issued pursuant to the exercise of the new warrants and
Figure 2.1
Existing Group Before Restructuring
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conversion of redeemable cumulative convertible preference
shares into new shares (SCB) under the GWRS.
ii) High Court of Malaya had granted an order pursuant to Section
176(3) of the Companies Act 1965, sanctioning the proposed
scheme of arrangement of the Lion Group and of Amsteel Mills
Sdn Bhd (a 99.9% owned subsidiary company of LLB).
The restructuring exercise was to facilitate the tapping of future cash
flows/dividends from four companies; Megasteel, SFI, Silverstone, and
brewery investment under LDH. The business activities would be
streamlined to be more focused by way of segregating the companies
accordingly
i) Lion Corporation Berhad (LCB): Steel through Megasteel.
ii) Lion Industries Corp. Berhad (LICB): Steel and wood products
through Sabah Forest Industries.
iii) Chocolate Products (LDH): Breweries and property investment
holding.
iv) Silverstone: Automotive and tyres through Suzuki and
Silverstone.
V) Amsteel Corporation Berhad (ACB): Property development,
Parkson retail, and plantation assets.
Figure 2.2
Lion Group of Companies after Restructuring
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WEALTH EFFECT OF THE GROUP PROPOSED CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING
The main interest to our study is the wealth effect or returns to the
shareholders resulting from the corporate restructuring at the four
stages, referred to earlier as PCR-I, PCR-II, PCR-III, and PCR-IV. In
other words, the “event” in this case study is defined as the initial
restructuring announcement dated 5 July 2000 (PCR-I), the second
announcement dated on 8 October 2001 (PCR-II), the third
announcement on 26 March 2002 (PCR-III) and fourth announcement
on 19 March 2003 (PCR-IV), whereas, the “event date” is the date the
announcement first appears in the KLSE listed company
announcement. Data for the daily prices and Kuala Lumpur Composite
Index (KLCI) price index for the event windows for the period of 2000
to 2003 were downloaded from the Datastream. Table 2 provides the
descriptive statistics of the abnormal return of individual company’s
stock prices according to the individual restructuring announcement
and event windows. Furthermore, we discuss the changes in the
abnormal return due to these announcements.
This study used the daily stock return of the six companies for the
period of 50 days prior to the announcement and 50 days after the
announcement window period. To determine whether the
announcements convey information to the market, cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) were calculated based on the simplified
market model, which constrainted alpha and beta to 0 and 1,
respectively.
In determining the CARs, the study followed the standard market
model event study which contrains a and b to equal to 0 and 1
respectively, such that RM,t (the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index) is
the company ith’s expected return. Thus, the abnormal return (ARi,t)
for company i is the difference between the actual return on day t and
its expected return (RM,t). ARi,t = Ri,t - (RM,t), where the daily returns of
stock I, is calculated as follows;                                       , where Pt is the price
of stock i on trading day t and Pt-1 is its price one trading day before
that. Similarly, the market return equals to;                                                               .
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for company i is calculated
as;                                      . It is important to determine if the announcements
RM,t =    × 100
KLCIt - KLCIt-1
KLCIt-1
Ri,t =    × 100
Pt - Pt-1
Pt-1
CARi,t =  ∑ ARi,t
N
t-1w
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convey information to the market at all. Following Baek et al. (2001), t-
statistics was used to test the hypothesis that the average CARs are
significantly different from zero at each event windows. We were able
to find the t-statistic using the following equation:
              where σCAR =σAR √K and σARis the standard error of daily return
over the estimation period excluding the exclusion period, and K is
the number of days in the CAR statistic. Results of the t-tests are
presented in Table 4.
T-TEST RESULTS
PCR-I (5 July 2000)
The results in Table 4 revealed that prior to the announcement, only
LFI reported positively significant price impact (20.35%), while for the
post announcement, only LICB reported positively significant stock
price impact in event window (+10,-10), (-5,+5), and (0,+5), respectively,
while SCB was only positively significant (15.53%) in event window
(0,+5). LFI was also positively significant in event window (-10,+10),
(+5,-5), (-5,0), (+1,-1), (-1,0), and (0,+1). LICB stock price impact as
measured by CAR was also significantly positive (21.29%) while in
contrast, SCB was significantly negative (-29.664%) in event window
(-1,+1) and (-1,0) respectively, around the announcement. The average
CAR was positively significant in event window (-5,+5) (0,+5), and (-
1,+1) respectively. Moreover, the announcement had no significant price
impact at all on LCB and ACB. These results show that the market
responses were based on information content of individual companies
in the Group announcement eventhough the announcement referred
to the Group as a whole.
PCR-II (8 October 2001)
The second announcement was about another debt restructuring
scheme where these six companies divested its assets to settle some of
their term loans. This exercise also helped the Group to focus more on
its core business. The proceeds from the asset divestment would
provide the cash flow to service the term loans over the next five years.
Prior to this announcement, none of the companies reported significant
price impact while for the post announcement period, only SCB
reported negative significant (-23.915%) price impact in event window
CAR
σCAR
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Event 
Window LICB SCB LCB ACB LFI LDH AVERAGE LICB SCB LCB ACB LFI LDH AVERAGE
(-50,+50) CAR -21.328 -30.831 -30.664 -51.6 14.736 -34.257 -25.657 39.343 -14.987 -25.436 1.79 0.745 32.784 5.706
t-test -0.616 -1.184 -0.94 -1.21 0.548 -0.963 -1.289 0.355 -0.299 -0.495 0.025 0.024 0.626 0.138
(-50,0) CAR -17.292 -27.908 -7.896 -12.55 9.559 -11.58 -11.278 3.121 -2.254 -22.202 -21.144 -0.797 14.19 -4.848
t-test -0.858 -1.704 -0.333 -0.479 0.425 -0.576 -0.869 0.068 -0.056 -0.494 -0.478 -0.03 0.311 -0.15
(0,+50) CAR -5.375 -4.262 -24.107 -40.39 3.837 -24.016 -15.719 25.988 -16.88 -1.718 20.45 -0.963 20.11 7.831
t-test -0.189 -0.21 -1.066 -1.195 0.255 -0.812 -1.031 0.256 -0.556 -0.068 0.36 -0.059 0.766 0.301
(-30,+30) CAR -5.414 -18.39 -10.771 -21.698 13.938 -13.792 -9.354 28.291 -20.468 -13.306 6.428 6.385 11.33 3.11
t-test -0.186 -0.818 -0.39 -0.654 0.578 -0.629 -0.591 0.27 -0.563 -0.302 0.105 0.228 0.273 0.095
(-30,0) CAR -13.671 -22.495 -3.276 -13.658 6.296 -7.679 -9.081 -25.912 -16.797 -16.887 -23.413 -5.546 -7.375 -15.988
t-test -0.808 -1.633 -0.157 -0.577 0.366 -0.491 -0.804 -0.751 -0.58 -0.432 -0.685 -0.277 -0.249 -0.686
(0,+30) CAR 6.918 2.766 -8.833 -9.379 6.302 -7.452 -1.613 43.969 -7.819 5.096 27.357 9.427 20.22 16.375
t-test 0.291 0.156 -0.477 -0.397 0.367 -0.477 -0.143 0.44 -0.344 0.244 0.538 0.472 0.683 0.702
(-10,+10) CAR 31.12 20.253 -7.507 7.366 28.233 14.593 15.677 51.435 -17.699 8.274 -3.576 33.14 15.452 14.504
t-test 1.825* 1.535 -0.463 0.378 1.996* 1.134 1.687 1.157 -1.146 0.443 -0.138 2.014* 0.634 0.756
(-10,0) CAR 10.65 7.014 -2.391 8.323 18.258 14.005 9.31 12.989 5.024 15.807 6.342 18.959 16.71 12.638
t-test 0.863 0.735 -0.204 0.591 1.784 1.504 1.384 0.292 0.325 0.846 0.244 1.592 0.948 0.91
(0,+10) CAR 19.131 11.899 -6.455 -2.296 8.636 -0.751 5.027 28.212 -26.87 -6.017 -12.402 11.676 0.258 -0.857
t-test 1.55 1.246 -0.55 -0.163 0.844 -0.081 0.747 0.635 -1.74 -0.322 -0.478 0.981 0.015 -0.062
(-5,+5) CAR 37.385 15.95 4.531 17.227 31.036 11.223 19.558 42.773 -10.007 -1.212 -4.458 24.609 5.952 9.61
t-test 3.028* 1.67 0.386 1.222 3.032* 1.205 2.907* 0.962 -0.648 -0.065 -0.172 2.067* 0.338 0.692
(-5,0) CAR 8.749 -0.925 1.316 7.702 20.356 6.094 7.216 2.098 9.761 2.307 -1.288 9.385 3.24 4.25
t-test 0.96 -0.131 0.152 0.74 2.693* 0.886 1.452 0.064 0.856 0.167 -0.067 1.067 0.249 0.414
(0,+5) CAR 27.297 15.535 1.875 8.185 9.34 3.789 11.004 30.441 -23.915 -2.003 -5.654 12.72 4.228 2.636
t-test 2.994* 2.203* 0.216 0.786 1.236 0.551 2.215* 0.927 -2.097* -0.145 -0.295 1.446 0.325 0.257
(-1,+1) CAR 21.298 0.184 -2.7 7.076 27.365 3.042 9.377 -10.73 -17.091 18.378 -3.798 11.365 0.202 -0.279
t-test 3.304* 0.037 -0.441 1.764 5.119* 0.626 2.669* -0.462 -2.120* 1.883 -0.28 1.828 0.022 -0.038
(-1,0) CAR -4.69 -29.664 -7.99 -7.305 14.415 5.238 5.049 -13.047 -7.519 11.351 -2.149 -2.169 1.851 -1.947
t-test -0.891 -7.286* -1.597 -1.216 3.303* 1.319 1.76 -0.688 -1.142 1.424 -0.194 -0.427 0.246 -0.329
(0,+1) CAR 8.695 1.94 -2.607 1.832 11.611 -3.536 2.989 -7.917 -13.719 8.542 -4.133 11.03 -0.133 -1.055
t-test 1.652 0.476 -0.521 0.305 2.660* -0.891 1.042 -0.418 -2.084* 1.072 -0.374 2.172* -0.018 -0.178
Proposed Corporate Restructuring 1 Proposed Corporate Restructuring 2
Event 
Window LICB SCB LCB ACB LFI LDH AVERAGE LICB SCB LCB ACB LFI LDH AVERAGE
(-50,+50) CAR -13.676 -59.015 26.943 -49.57 -33.433 -3.078 -21.971 33.369 -17.568 15.374 252.454 8.523 56.637 58.132
t-test -0.39 -0.98 0.655 -6.354* -1.699 -0.093 -1.076 0.846 -0.239 0.444 1.028 0.392 1.576 1.191
(-50,0) CAR -33.7 -15.178 6.312 -25.629 -24.287 -14.18 -17.777 14.964 48.447 8.181 60.248 11.092 35.411 29.724
t-test -1.501 -0.569 0.168 -4.317* -2.014* -0.61 -1.248 0.48 0.803 0.611 0.749 0.645 1.338 1.259
(0,+50) CAR 17.547 -44.512 18.859 -25.092 -9.279 10.427 -5.341 18.532 -65.888 7.319 192.332 -3.566 21.353 28.347
t-test 0.657 -0.821 1.083 -4.860* -0.594 0.442 -0.362 0.757 -1.611 0.228 0.826 -0.266 0.87 0.659
(-30,+30) CAR 21.141 -0.676 34.488 -35.658 -19.502 9.773 1.594 39.096 37.513 27.072 289.331 0.646 10.513 67.362
t-test 0.697 -0.017 0.918 -5.663* -1.065 0.366 0.098 1.049 0.553 0.86 1.212 0.033 0.358 1.451
(-30,0) CAR -16.774 -7.397 4.361 -16.58 -16.901 -11.233 -10.754 13.264 68.38 8.692 70.736 5.995 7.267 29.056
t-test -0.807 -0.304 0.124 -3.282* -1.295 -0.589 -0.925 0.448 1.182 0.747 1.09 0.426 0.347 0.878
(0,+30) CAR 35.438 6.046 28.354 -20.229 -2.733 20.33 11.201 25.959 -30.74 18.506 218.721 -6.345 3.373 38.246
t-test 0.54 0.28 0.857 -1.442 -0.209 1.067 0.963 1.124 -0.898 0.628 0.947 -0.451 0.161 1.155
(-10,+10) CAR 29.64 -3.817 58.062 -14.682 -0.011 0.63 11.637 5.44 30.901 1.064 -0.88 -4.606 -13.138 3.13
t-test 1.667 -0.159 2.633* -3.974* -0.001 0.04 1.216 0.249 0.776 0.058 -0.006 -0.398 -0.763 0.115
(-10,0) CAR 8.161 1.072 35.332 -7.048 -1.188 -0.89 5.906 -0.088 10.385 1.63 -7.353 -0.02 -3.812 0.124
t-test 0.634 0.062 2.214* -2.636* -0.153 -0.078 0.853 -0.006 0.36 0.122 -0.073 -0.002 -0.306 0.006
(0,+10) CAR 19.002 -5.564 20.958 -8.785 1.045 0.845 4.583 5.654 20.643 -0.44 6.6 -5.583 -9.199 2.946
t-test 1.476 -0.321 1.313 -3.285* 0.134 0.074 0.662 0.357 0.716 -0.033 0.065 -0.666 -0.738 0.149
(-5,+5) CAR 19.028 -8.776 28.797 -5.895 0.232 4.459 6.308 -0.55 38.174 -5.245 -7.446 -7.063 -1.28 2.765
t-test 1.478 -0.507 1.804 -2.204* 0.03 0.393 0.91 -0.035 1.325 -0.392 -0.073 -0.843 -0.103 0.14
(-5,0) CAR 8.958 -1.971 24.406 -3.045 -3.088 5.009 5.045 3.213 8.475 0.334 -10.408 -1.357 0.391 0.108
t-test 0.942 -0.154 2.071* -1.542 -0.538 0.597 0.986 0.275 0.398 0.034 -0.139 -0.219 0.042 0.007
(0,+5) CAR 7.593 -7.481 2.618 -4 3.188 -1.225 0.116 -3.637 29.826 -5.452 3.088 -6.703 -1.544 2.596
t-test 0.799 -0.585 0.222 -2.026* 0.555 -0.146 0.023 -0.311 1.401 -0.552 0.041 -1.083 -0.168 0.178
(-1,+1) CAR 2.209 -0.052 0.952 -1.502 1.032 -0.052 0.431 -3.392 1.904 1.428 15.713 0.304 -1.43 2.421
t-test 0.329 -0.006 0.114 -1.075 0.254 -0.009 0.119 -0.41 0.126 0.205 0.297 0.069 -0.22 0.235
(-1,0) CAR 2.902 0.642 1.645 -0.333 1.185 0.642 1.114 -1.401 -5.687 0.98 0.98 -0.144 -1.877 -1.191
t-test 0.529 0.087 0.242 -0.292 0.358 0.133 0.377 -0.208 -0.463 0.172 0.023 -0.04 -0.353 -0.142
(0,+1) CAR -3.171 -1.369 -2.466 -2.319 -0.285 -1.369 -1.83 -1.865 7.717 0.574 14.86 -0.549 0.574 3.552
t-test -0.578 -0.185 -0.362 -2.034* -0.086 -0.283 -0.619 -0.276 0.628 0.101 0.344 -0.154 0.108 0.422
Proposed Corporate Restructuring 3 Proposed Corporate Restructuring 4
Table 4
The Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Individual and Combined
Companies at the Restructuring Announcement 1-4
Notes: Figures in the first row is the of CARs, in italics are the t-statistics, and
* represent significant levels 0.1 to test the mean difference from test
value = 0w
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(0,+5), as shown in Table 5(b). LFI reported positively significant
(33.14%) and (11.03%) price impact in event window (-10,+10) and
(0,+1) respectively. However, only SCB reported negatively significant
price impact (-17.091%) and (-13.719%) in event window (-1,+1) and
(0,+1) respectively, around the announcement. Furthermore, none of
the average CARs were significant. Overall, the market responses more
favourably to the PCR-I compared to PCR-II, since it reported a
positively significant price impact in the case of LICB, LFI, and Average,
while LFI reported positively significant stock price impact in PCR-II
around the announcement.
PCR-III (26 March 2002)
The results showed that only ACB reported a negatively significant (-
2.319%) stock price impact around the announcement. Prior to the
announcement, only LCB reported a positively significant price impact
(24.406%) and (35.332%) in event window (-5,0) and (-10, 0), while in
contrast. ACB reported negatively significant (-7.048%), (-16.580%), and
(–25.629%) in event window (-10,0), (-30,0), and (-50,0). Meanwhile LFI
was also negatively significant (-24.287%) in event window (-50,0). For
post-announcement, only ACB reported a negatively significant price
impact in each event window (0,+5), (0,+10), (0,+30), and (0,+50). None
of the average CARs were reported significant.
PCR-IV(19 March 2003)
The results showed that none of the companies reported a significant
price impact prior to, around and post announcement. Furthermore,
 
Event 
Window 
Specific  
Events  LICB SCB LCB ACB LFI LDH AVERAGE 
(-5,+5) PCR 1 37.385* 15.95 4.531 17.227 31.036* 11.223 19.558* 
 PCR 2 42.773 -10.007 -1.212 -4.458 24.609* 5.952 9.610 
 PCR 3 19.028 -8.776 28.797 -5.895* 0.232 4.459 6.308 
 PCR 4 -0.55 38.174 -5.245 -7.446 -7.063 -1.280 2.765 
  61.251 35.341 26.871 -0.572 48.814 20.354 38.241 
         
(-1,+1) PCR 1 21.298* 0.184 -2.7 7.076 27.365* 3.042 9.377* 
 PCR 2 -10.73 -17.091* 18.378 -3.798 11.365 0.202 -0.279 
 PCR 3 2.209 -0.052 0.952 -1.502 1.032 -0.052 0.431 
 PCR 4 -3.392 1.904 1.428 15.713 0.304 -1.430 2.421 
  11.913 -15.055 18.058 17.489 40.066 1.762 11.95 
 
 
Table 5
Summary of the Cumulative Wealth Effects at the Three Stages of
the Restructing Process
* represent significant levels 0.1 to test the mean difference from test value = 0
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none of the average CARs were significant. This was due to the fact
that the market may already perceive the announcement as merely an
adjustment and revision of the previous announcement made earlier.
CONCLUSION
The case study evolved the around four announcements related to a
specific corporate restructuring proposal. The primary reason for the
corporate restructuring was to restructure the debt of six companies,
Lion Industries, Silverstone, Amsteel Corp Berhad, Lion Forest
Industries, Lion Diversified Holding, and Lion Corporation. The track
record of the companies revealed that these companies have been
heavily levered causing them to be financially risky and therefore,
highly sensitive to any economic shocks, let alone a fatal financial
typhoon like the 1997 economic crisis. By applying the common event-
study approach, the t-test results indicated that information about the
restructuring plan had been significantly conveyed to the market in
each restructuring announcement. Generally, the market regarded all
announcements unfavourably.
The main interest of the study was the combined wealth effect of the
event announcement at each stage of the restructuring announcement
and overall announcements as shown by Table 6. Using CAR of the
narrow event window of (-1,+1) the following results surfaced. The
wealth of all companies had increase except SCB with LFI shareholders
realising the highest return. Thus, if the results of the narrow event
window of (-1,+1) were used to guide the evaluation, the restructuring
process would end up a win-lose-win-win-win-win strategy for LICB,
SCB,LCB ACB, LFI, and LDH, respectively.
Nonetheless, the broader event window of (-5,+5) produced higher
positive wealth effects than event window (-1,+1). In contrast to event
window (-1, +1), the wealth of all companies had increased except for
ACB with LICB shareholders realising the highest return. Furthermore,
LICB, SCB and LCB shareholders realised higher return due to PCR-II
compared to PCR-I. In conclusion, based on the broader event window
of (-5,+5), the restructuring process became a win-win-win-lose-win-
win strategy for LICB, SCB,LCB ACB, LFI, and LDH,
respectively.Whether the full value of the restructuring plan remains
positive or negative, or whether the plan is a lose or win strategy,
remains a question that only time can answer. Additionally, a follow
up study is almost compulsory to make the present study more
complete.w
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END NOTES
1 The key financial data of the financial performance, capital structure,
and liquidity of these companies can be obtained upon request.
2 Detailed information regarding GWRS1-GWRS4 can be obtained
upon request.
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